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READ FIRST - this post.

Nieubasria, Resu, and T&C are in the midst of a multinational investigation into organized crime and passport fraud, which prompted the government to try to get others on board with stricter passport requirements and standards. 

This is OOC, but quasi-IC.

 

HOW TO JOIN / INTERACT

  • You may freely join the "Multinational Working Group Regarding Passport Security and Travel Document Standards". No need to apply. 
  • You MAY post opinions or questions from the perspective of your Nation. Try to post these as a "Proposal" or amendment to the standards. 
    • You can also just agree, no need to post. 
  • You MAY decide that these standards are acceptable for your nation, and then you MAY:
    • 1. design your own passport cover with the agreed upon standards
    • 2. ask me to design one for you in the same/similar style as my own.  (if this is the case, I may refuse if it is too damn much) 
  • You are HEAVILY ENCOURAGED to work this into some RP somewhere, whether it be a news post or other worldbuilding. Up to you. 

 

My passports are attached for reference. 

Nieu Passport.png

Nieu Passport - Diplomatic.png

Nieu Passport - Service.png

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Multinational Working Group Regarding Passport Security and Travel Document Standards:

Proposed Standards for Biometric and Machine-Readable Travel Documents - Passports
DOC-1

1. SCOPE

These standards represent a structuring of the MWG specifications for Machine Readable Travel Documents to be used by States wishing to issue an electronic Machine Readable Travel Document (eMRTD) capable of being used by any suitably equipped receiving State to read and to authenticate data relating to the eMRTD itself and verification of its holder.

This includes mandatory globally interoperable biometric data that can be used as an input to facial recognition systems, and, optionally, to fingerprint or iris recognition systems. The specifications require the globally interoperable biometric data to be stored in the form of high-resolution images on a high-capacity contactless integrated circuit (IC), the IC also being encoded with a duplicate of the data. The specifications also permit the storage of a range of optional data at the discretion of the issuing State. Since the use of the contactless IC is
independent of the size of the document, all specifications apply to all eMRTD sizes in their electronically enabled form.
 

2. STANDARDS COMMON TO THE MRTD

220px-ISO_IEC_7810.PNG

 

 

TD-1

The ID-1 format specifies a size of 85.60 by 53.98 millimetres (3 38 in × 2 18 in)
and rounded corners with a radius of 2.88–3.48 mm (about 18 in). It is commonly used for payment cards

TD-2

The ID-2 format specifies a size of 105 by 74 millimetres (4 18 in × 2 1516 in). This size is the A7 format.

TD-3

ID-3 specifies a size of 125 by 88 millimetres (4 1516 in × 3 716 in). This size is the B7 format.
This format is commonly used for passport booklets. 

TD-000

ID-000 specifies a size of 25 by 15 millimetres (1 in × 916 in), with one corner slightly (3 mm or 18 in) bevelled.

 

2.1 STANDARDS ADOPTED BY MWG

The MRTD shall be issued and presented in the TD-3 or TD-1 Standards in the case of a Passport Booklet or Passport Card form factors, respectively. 

2.1.1 MANDATORY ZONES AND FIELDS ON TD-3 (PASSPORT BOOKLET)

image.png.d7ef8904a38ba7f03afcbaf2963b32f2.png
Note 2.— Fields 01-19 are required on all MRTD (Passport Booklets)

 

 

2.1.2 MANDATORY ZONES AND FIELDS ON TD-1 (PASSPORT CARD)

image.png.3d84864c4ec7c2308da73365cd4d0daf.png

 

3. SECURITY OF THE MRTD AND ITS ISSUANCE

The MRTD, and its method of issuance, shall be designed to incorporate safeguards to protect the document against fraudulent attack during its validity period. Methods of fraudulent attack can be classified as follows:
• Counterfeit involves the creation of all or part of a document which resembles the genuine MRTD with the intention that it be used as if it were genuine. Counterfeits may be produced by attempting to duplicate or simulate the genuine method of manufacture and the materials used therein or by using copying techniques;
• Fraudulent alteration, also known as forgery, involves the alteration of a genuine document in an attempt to enable it to be used for travel by an unauthorized person or to an unauthorized destination. The biographical details of the genuine holder, particularly the portrait, form the prime target for such alteration; and
•Impostors. “Impostor” is defined as someone representing themself to be some other person. Security features should be incorporated to facilitate the visual and/or automated detection of fraudulent use of the MRTD by an impostor.

There are established methods of providing security against the above types of fraudulent attack. These involve the use of materials which are not readily available, combined with highly specialized design systems and manufacturing processes requiring special equipment and expertise.

3.1 PROVISION OF INFORMATION ON LOST AND STOLEN MRTDS

The exchange of information on lost, stolen or revoked travel documents is a key strategy to strengthen border control and mitigate the impacts of identity theft and immigration fraud. Accordingly, States should consider implementing the following operational procedures to offset the threats that work to undermine border management and national public safety:
1. communicating proactively with document holders;
2. maintaining national databases of lost, stolen and revoked travel documents;
3. sharing information about lost, stolen and revoked travel documents with International Police and verifying documents against databases systematically at primary inspection;
4. installing checks to determine whether a holder is presenting a lost, stolen or revoked document at a border crossing.

 

 

4. eMRTD
 Note.— The terms MRTD and eMRTD are used in this document as a generic reference to all types of
Machine Readable Travel Documents in, respectively, optical character reading and electronically enabled forms.
 All eMRTDs referred to in this Part are electronically enabled.


4.1 Validity Period for an eMRTD

The validity period of an eMRTD is at the discretion of the issuing State; however, in consideration of the limited durability of documents and the changing appearance of the document holder over time, a validity period of not more than ten years is RECOMMENDED. States MAY wish to consider a shorter period to enable the progressive upgrading of the eMRTD as the technology evolves. 

 

4.3 Chip Inside Symbol

This document focuses on biometrics in relation to Machine Readable Travel Documents, using the term “eMRTD” to denote such biometrically-enabled and globally-interoperable MRTD. Any MRTD that does not comply with the specifications given in Doc 1 may not be called an eMRTD and shall not display the Chip Inside symbol.

All eMRTDs shall carry the following symbol:


image.png.a9f831760b4ef2e4d66725c86e6619b8.png
Figure 1. Chip Inside symbol


The symbol SHALL only appear on an eMRTD that contains a contactless integrated circuit, with a data storage capacity of at least 32 kB, that is encoded in accordance with the Logical Data Structure (Doc 1-10) with, as a minimum, the data in Data Group 1 and a facial image as specified in this part in Data Group 2, with all entered data secured with a digital signature as specified in Doc 1-11. Unless an eMRTD conforms to these minimum requirements, it SHALL NOT be described as an eMRTD nor display the Chip Inside symbol.

The symbol shall appear on the front cover of the eMRTD if it is a TD3 size book (eMRP) either near the top or the bottom of the cover, or on the front side of the eMRTD if it is in the format of a card (eMROTD).

On an eMRP the symbol shall be included in the foil blocking or other image on the front cover. It is recommended that he symbol also be printed on the data page in a suitable colour and in a location which does not interfere with the reading of other data. The issuing State may also print the symbol on the inside page or cover of the passport book that contains the contactless IC and, at the State’s discretion, elsewhere in the passport.


The image, as shown in Figure 1, is a positive, i.e. the black part of the image shall be printed or otherwise imaged. It is RECOMMENDED that the symbol appears eye-visible and is easily recognizable. The symbol MAY be scaled in proportion for use in, for example, background designs. 

 

4.4 Warning regarding Care in Handling an eMRP

It is suggested that a warning be placed in an obvious location on the book urging the holder of an eMRP to take care of the document. A suggested wording is:

“This passport contains sensitive electronics. For best performance please do not bend, perforate or expose to extreme temperatures or excess moisture”.

In addition, the issuing State may mark the part of the page containing the IC and the corresponding parts of some adjacent pages with the caveat:

“Do not stamp here”.

________________________________________END DOCUMENT________________________________________

For Reference Purposes Only 

 

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

[OOC REFERENCES]
1.https://www.icao.int/publications/pages/publication.aspx?docnum=9303

 

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While international cooperation in all areas is a laudable goal, and one we would like to support, the Fujansk Utanriksministerjon has a number of concerns regarding the safety and security of the eMRTD initiative, laid out as follows:

  1. The initiative is meant to combat theft of physical travel documents, but it seems to be woefully lacking similar discussion on the consequences of the theft of the electronic information stored within the contactless IC. Without proper security and encryption on ICs, they would lower security instead of increasing it.
  2. To this effect, what assurances can the Working Group give us that, should we join the initiative, our citizens' personal information will be safe from theft and misuse?
  3. Should Fujai decline to include biometric data on an IC and the Working Group creates its own standards, can we be assured that our citizens would continue to receive the same treatment in Working Group countries that they do today?

From the office of Runar Onnstad, Fujais Utanriksrådgafar

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On 3/7/2020 at 12:03 AM, Fujai said:

kBLUe59.png

While international cooperation in all areas is a laudable goal, and one we would like to support, the Fujansk Utanriksministerjon has a number of concerns regarding the safety and security of the eMRTD initiative, laid out as follows:

  1. The initiative is meant to combat theft of physical travel documents, but it seems to be woefully lacking similar discussion on the consequences of the theft of the electronic information stored within the contactless IC. Without proper security and encryption on ICs, they would lower security instead of increasing it.
  2. To this effect, what assurances can the Working Group give us that, should we join the initiative, our citizens' personal information will be safe from theft and misuse?
  3. Should Fujai decline to include biometric data on an IC and the Working Group creates its own standards, can we be assured that our citizens would continue to receive the same treatment in Working Group countries that they do today?

From the office of Runar Onnstad, Fujais Utanriksrådgafar

73541235_NieuEstates-Ministrysmall.png.c0c14d230ca7aab4cdd853da56b0dd22.png

 

With regard to the communication from the Fujansk Utanriksministerjon, the Estates-Ministry shall first state it does not intend to represent any other states of the Multinational Working Group Regarding Passport Security and Travel Document Standards in its responses to the inquiries posed by the office of the Most Honourable Runar Onnstad. However, the Estates-Ministry recognizes its significant role in the drafting of the Proposed Standards for Biometric and Machine-Readable Travel Documents - Passports, referred to as DOC-1 by the Working Group. With the aforementioned recognitions, responses have been prepared as follows - inquiries in bold:

1. The initiative is meant to combat theft of physical travel documents, but it seems to be woefully lacking similar discussion on the consequences of the theft of the electronic information stored within the contactless IC. Without proper security and encryption on ICs, they would lower security instead of increasing it.

The security of electronic information is considered second only to the physical security of the travel document. The Estates-Ministry intends, in collaboration with technical and scientific ministries to publish a data security infrastructure to be captured in the following:

DOC-1-10: Deployment of Biometric Identification and Electronic Storage of Data in eMRTDs

  • Part 10 defines the specifications, additional to those for the basic MRTD set forth DOC-1, to be used by States wishing to issue an electronic Machine Readable Travel Document (eMRTD) capable of being used by any suitably equipped receiving State to read and to authenticate data relating to the eMRTD itself and verification of its holder. This includes mandatory globally interoperable biometric data that can be used as an input to facial recognition systems, and, optionally, to fingerprint or iris recognition systems. The specifications require the globally interoperable biometric data to be stored in the form of high-resolution images on a high-capacity contactless integrated circuit (IC), the IC also being encoded with a duplicate of the MRZ data. The specifications also permit the storage of a range of optional data at the discretion of the issuing State. Since the use of the contactless IC is independent of the size of the document, all specifications apply to all eMRTD sizes in their electronically enabled form. Differences between eMRTD formats relate to the MRZ, with consequences for the storage of the MRZ in the contactless IC. These differences are indicated in the specifications of the Logical Data Structure in DOC-1-11.

DOC-1-11: Logical Data Structure (LDS) for Storage of Biometrics and Other Data in the Contactless Integrated Circuit (IC)

  • This Part 11 of DOC-1 defines the Logical Data Structure (LDS) for eMRTDs required for global interoperability and defines the specifications for the organization of data on the contactless IC. This requires the identification of all mandatory and optional Data Elements and a prescriptive ordering and/or grouping of Data Elements that MUST be followed to achieve global interoperability for electronic reading of the eMRTD. DOC-1-11 provides specifications to enable States and integrators to implement a contactless IC into an eMRTD travel document. This part defines all mandatory and optional data elements, file structures, and application profiles for the contactless IC. 

DOC-1-12: Security Mechanisms for MRTDs

  • This Part 12 provides specifications to enable States and suppliers to implement cryptographic security features for electronic machine readable travel documents (“eMRTDs”) offering contactless integrated circuit (IC) read-only access. Cryptographic protocols are specified to:
     • prevent skimming of data from the contactless IC;
     • prevent eavesdropping on the communication between contactless IC and reader;
     • provide authentication of the data stored on the contactless IC based on the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) described in this Part 12; and
     • provide authentication of the contactless IC itself.
    Additional access control to sensitive data (i.e. secondary biometrics) is not specified in this edition of DOC-1, but national schemes to protect these data are allowed. An interoperable specification is foreseen for future editions of DOC-1.

    The authentication of the data stored on the contactless IC is the basic security feature to enable the use of the IC for manual and/or automated inspection. This feature is therefore REQUIRED.
    Implementation of a protocol to prevent skimming of the data stored on the contactless IC and to prevent eavesdropping on the communication between IC and terminal is RECOMMENDED.
    Implementation of the other protocols is OPTIONAL, allowing the issuing State or organization to decide on the necessary set of security features according to national regulations/demands. 

These above standards will provide minimum standards and recommendations for the production, use, and verification of more secure travel documents. The Estates-Ministry values the inquiry on such an integral matter at the core of the portfolio of the Working Group, and has distinct hopes these and any ensuing standards will advance the physical and electronic security of all states and their citizens. 


2. To this effect, what assurances can the Working Group give us that, should we join the initiative, our citizens' personal information will be safe from theft and misuse?

Again recognizing that the Estates-Ministry does not speak for the Working Group, the Estates-Ministry believes the safety of citizens should be the primary duty of a responsible nation and thus have seen to it that security has been the primary concern in all steps of the drafting of these Standards. 

First, a nation will at all times be in control of its citizens personal information in the creation and issuance of Travel Documents under these Standards. There is no obligation on a state to provide to another other state any citizen's information - though it is reasonable of a state to require a Travel Document at a port of entry or where otherwise necessary. Thus it is the citizen's choice to provide the Travel Document to another state's officials and therefore reveal the information within it. In the opinion of the Estates-Ministry, what a state then does with the information from within should be limited to governmental or law-enforcement functions, though this Working Group (and all reasonable states) cannot enforce restrictions on another state regarding the use of that information on grounds of sovereignty. Further, there is no electronic or physical method to prevent a state or individual to manually copy the information contained in the Travel Document that would not render the Travel Document useless to the receiving state. 

Second, it is incumbent upon each bearer of a Travel Document to be aware that each time the Travel Document is read, by a state or otherwise, a data breach is possible merely on the visible information. Personal data hygiene aside, if an issuing state is concerned with unauthorized access of electronic information there are measures such as a thin metal mesh between the access area of the contactless IC and the cover of the passport booklet to ensure 'pass-by' attacks are thwarted. 

 

3. Should Fujai decline to include biometric data on an IC and the Working Group creates its own standards, can we be assured that our citizens would continue to receive the same treatment in Working Group countries that they do today?

With the assumption this question is predicated upon treatment at ports of entry or during required identity verification, this is expected to vary state-by-state.

States may choose to adopt the Standards for the simple means of security for that state's Travel Documents, or a State may choose to adopt the Standards as minimum requirements for all incoming Travel Documents. Nieubasria intends to adopt the Standards for newly issued Travel Documents prior to the end of 1420, and is expecting to adopt the Standards a minimums for acceptance of Travel Documents at ports of entry by 1425. 

Nieubasria highly recommends the inclusion of at least the minimum suggested biometric data in an internationally-interoperable standard to provide the greatest level of shared security and minimize the total number of a state's citizens being subjected to secondary inspection at ports of entry. 

 

 

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Fujais Utanriksministerjonet would first like to thank the Estates-Ministry for their timely and detailed responses to our concerns. While insightful, they were, from our perspective, not all in the direction we had hoped the Working Group would choose.

FIrstly, it is the Utanriksministerjon's position that the personal security of Fujansk citizens is of the highest concern, and that the physical security of passports falls second. The standards and recommendations listed in DOC 1-10 through 1-12 we hope, will be adequate to ensure such security. However, from our current position outside the Working Group, we believe that DOC-1-12's statement on implementation of data-skimming prevention protocols should be a required part of the proposed standards, or the identities of millions could be at risk if states choose not to implement them.

Secondly, and related, will systems of enforcement put into place to ensure that the Working Group's standards are upheld by member states, or are these standards simply to provide a baseline in the hopes that other states follow the minimum recommendations?

Thirdly, with respect to entry requirements, we are concerned by the idea that citizens of states that do not follow any or all of these standards would receive unfavorable treatment when compared to treatment before the Working Group's standards were developed. As it stands, there are enough instances of recommendations over requirements in these standards that the security they claim can be compromised easily with the correct technology, making such distinctions somewhat of a double standard.

Fourthly, while the Utanriksministerjon is well aware that many of these issues are, at the moment, matters of individual sovereign states alone, we caution that a false sense of security may be fostered by making such crimes as forgery more difficult through the inclusion of ICs while potentially making identity theft easier.

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Table of Contents

DOC-1-00: Introduction

DOC-1-01: Scope

DOC-1-02: Standards Common to the MRTD

DOC-1-03: Security of the MRTD and its Issuance

DOC-1-04: eMRTD

DOC-1-05: Emergency Travel Documents

DOC-1-06: (Reserved)
DOC-1-07: (Reserved)
DOC-1-08: (Reserved)
DOC-1-09: (Reserved)

DOC-1-10: Deployment of Biometric Identification and Electronic Storage of Data in eMRTDs

DOC-1-11: Logical Data Structure (LDS) for Storage of Biometrics and Other Data in the Contactless Integrated Circuit (IC)

DOC-1-12: Security Mechanisms for eMRTDs

 

 

Executive Summary

DOC-1-02: Standards Common to the MRTD

  • Part 3 defines specifications that are common to TD1 and TD3 size machine readable travel documents (MRTDs) including those necessary for global interoperability using visual inspection and machine readable (optical character recognition) means. These specifications also apply to machine readable travel documents that contain a contactless IC i.e. electronic machine readable travel documents (eMRTDs).

DOC-1-03: Security of the MRTD and its Issuance

  • This Part provides mandatory and optional specifications for the precautions to be taken by travel document issuing authorities to ensure that their MRTDs, and their means of personalization and issuance to the rightful holders, are secure against fraudulent attack. Mandatory and optional specifications are also provided for the physical security to be provided at the premises where the MRTDs are produced, personalized and issued and for the vetting of personnel involved in these operations. 

    To meet the need of increased document security, WMG’s technical advisors decided it would be desirable to publish a set of “recommended minimum security standards” as a guideline for all States issuing machine readable travel documents. Thus,
     • Appendix A to this Part describes security measures to be taken within the structure of the MRTD and of the premises in which it is produced;
     • Appendix B describes optional means of achieving machine-assisted document verification;
     • Appendix C describes the security measures to be taken to ensure the security of the personalization operations and of the documents in transit. 

DOC-1-05: eMRTD

  • This Part provides guidance to electronic travel document issuing authorities on the physical, technical, and design requirements of an eMRTD. This part also includes the definition and graphical identity of the "chip inside" symbol and other recommended textual notices. 

DOC-1-05: Emergency Travel Documents

  • This Part 5 of DOC-1 provides guidance on Emergency Travel Documents (ETDs). The purpose of this guidancematerial is to promote a consistent approach in the issuance of ETDs in order to:
    enhance the security of the document;
    protect the individual;
    promote greater confidence for border staff in handling ETDs at ports; and
    address the vulnerabilities presented by inconsistent practices and security features. 

 

 

DOC-1-10: Deployment of Biometric Identification and Electronic Storage of Data in eMRTDs

  • Part 10 defines the specifications, additional to those for the basic MRTD set forth DOC-1, to be used by States wishing to issue an electronic Machine Readable Travel Document (eMRTD) capable of being used by any suitably equipped receiving State to read and to authenticate data relating to the eMRTD itself and verification of its holder. This includes mandatory globally interoperable biometric data that can be used as an input to facial recognition systems, and, optionally, to fingerprint or iris recognition systems. The specifications require the globally interoperable biometric data to be stored in the form of high-resolution images on a high-capacity contactless integrated circuit (IC), the IC also being encoded with a duplicate of the MRZ data. The specifications also permit the storage of a range of optional data at the discretion of the issuing State. Since the use of the contactless IC is independent of the size of the document, all specifications apply to all eMRTD sizes in their electronically enabled form. Differences between eMRTD formats relate to the MRZ, with consequences for the storage of the MRZ in the contactless IC. These differences are indicated in the specifications of the Logical Data Structure in DOC-1-11.

DOC-1-11: Logical Data Structure (LDS) for Storage of Biometrics and Other Data in the Contactless Integrated Circuit (IC)

  • This Part 11 of DOC-1 defines the Logical Data Structure (LDS) for eMRTDs required for global interoperability and defines the specifications for the organization of data on the contactless IC. This requires the identification of all mandatory and optional Data Elements and a prescriptive ordering and/or grouping of Data Elements that MUST be followed to achieve global interoperability for electronic reading of the eMRTD. DOC-1-11 provides specifications to enable States and integrators to implement a contactless IC into an eMRTD travel document. This part defines all mandatory and optional data elements, file structures, and application profiles for the contactless IC. 

DOC-1-12: Security Mechanisms for eMRTDs

  • This Part 12 provides specifications to enable States and suppliers to implement cryptographic security features for electronic machine readable travel documents (“eMRTDs”) offering contactless integrated circuit (IC) read-only access. Cryptographic protocols are specified to:
     • prevent skimming of data from the contactless IC;
     • prevent eavesdropping on the communication between contactless IC and reader;
     • provide authentication of the data stored on the contactless IC based on the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) described in this Part 12; and
     • provide authentication of the contactless IC itself.
    Additional access control to sensitive data (i.e. secondary biometrics) is not specified in this edition of DOC-1, but national schemes to protect these data are allowed. An interoperable specification is foreseen for future editions of DOC-1.

    The authentication of the data stored on the contactless IC is the basic security feature to enable the use of the IC for manual and/or automated inspection. This feature is therefore REQUIRED.
    Implementation of a protocol to prevent skimming of the data stored on the contactless IC and to prevent eavesdropping on the communication between IC and terminal is RECOMMENDED.
    Implementation of the other protocols is OPTIONAL, allowing the issuing State or organization to decide on the necessary set of security features according to national regulations/demands. 

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3 hours ago, Clarkov said:

I would like to join the MWG. I look forward to being a member if it is accepted

 

 

No need to apply! As in the OP, you're just signalling your country's interest in adopting these standards. 

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TeralyonFA.png.e332526db1ae07e1856bf850cc4023d0.png

The Federated Teralyon Republic has always held the belief that a high international standard should exist for any and all important documentation.

While the current Teralyon Passport is still deemed adequate for our high standards, the security upgrades the MWG is implementing has stimulated talk that the Teralyon Passport should be redesigned to meet these new standards as well.


Therefore The Federated Teralyon Republic would like to formally state its intent of joining the; 

"Multinational Working Group Regarding Passport Security and Travel Document Standards"

 

Signed with the Marshal's blessing,

-Domir Vasin, Foreign Affairs Minister.

-Zandra Semic, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Minister.

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The Confederacy of Zoran has never had official passports even when we were introduced to the international community. However, with our rising interest in participating in global affairs, we have decided to join the Multinational Working Group Regarding Passport Security and Travel Document Standards. Thus we submit our passports to you(sorry for poor quality)

Passport_svg.2020_04_22_17_43_00.0.thumb.png.175e45bf1f39f1535fd56db766193cc2.png1778954924_ServicePassport.thumb.png.722fbabf1ed5a78642dc317dc7b72cfb.png122921591_DiploPassport.thumb.png.e8c467fd2d0bc0fc913523a73832d994.png

 

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All Governments are welcomed by the Estates-Ministry to the Working Group. HRH Passport Office has been conducting a review on the implementation of the Standards, as they stand above, by the end of this budget-year. 

The Nieubasric Delegation reiterates the standards as outlined in the previous posts and welcomes any further discussion. 

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Greetings One and All,

In the interest of aiding international diplomacy and community, King Alexander IV has expressed for The Kingdom of Marisalia and it's citizens and leaders to join this endeavor! 
 

Signed on behalf of His Grace, Prince Jonathan

Min. Joseph Sullivan

Minister of The Crown

Current Triumvirate Leaders
Executive Chancellor Edwin Brommel
Cardinal Daniel Burke

"Scientiam Et Fidam"
Fin

-----
OOC: I uhhhh might need help with designing our passports lol 

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On 7/10/2020 at 3:35 PM, MarisalaTriumvirate said:

Greetings One and All,

In the interest of aiding international diplomacy and community, King Alexander IV has expressed for The Kingdom of Marisalia and it's citizens and leaders to join this endeavor! 
[snip]

OOC: I uhhhh might need help with designing our passports lol 

Great to hear! Welcome, and feel free to get in touch on the discord channel with myself (or maybe Bran, since he was hosting an inkscape tutorial last night) for any help!

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